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- (b) Extending "peace" overtures and diplomatic feelers for four-power conversations, for separate Soviet accords with individual Western nations, and for disarmament discussions in the UN;
- (c) Inspiring industrial disturbance and possibly sabotage in U. S. and Western European defense, transportation and communication industries; and
- (d) Possibly directing further local Communist aggression in the Far East or elsewhere.

If, despite the foregoing Soviet measures, and despite the many other obstacles to effective U. S. mobilization upon which the Kremlin probably relies, the U. S. program promises materially to improve the relative U. S. power position, and the Western Allies appear united and firm, Soviet tactics may shift materially. Under these conditions, the Kremlin might:

- (a) Ostensibly soften its policy, and perhaps offer material concessions to the West in order to reduce international tension, forestall the completion of the U. S. program, disrupt the U. S. economy, and gain credit for the USSR as the champion of peace;
- (b) Attempt to seize the initiative by launching an immediate Soviet attack on the U. S. or its allies, in the belief either that a U. S. decision to attack the Soviet Union had been reached, or that the successful completion of the U. S. program would constitute an intolerable obstacle to the attainment of Soviet objectives.

4. If the USSR does not intend deliberately to provoke global war in the near future, but estimates that the U. S. is likely to do so, an announcement of full-scale U. S. mobilization might result in a Soviet attempt to seize the initiative by an early attack on the U. S. or its allies, as the alternative to making concessions which would reduce this likelihood.

WALTER B. SMITH
Director

4 cys w/#1 & 2 of basic to AD/NE

9-10 cys by hand DCI to NSC Mtg 11 Dec 50.

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